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Guang Ping He∗
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It is revealed that quantum repeating devices and quantum seals have a very close relationship,
thus the theory in one field can be applied to the other. Consequently, it is shown that the fidelity
bounds and optimality of quantum repeating devices for decoding quantum information can be
violated when they are used for decoding classical information from quantum states, and the security
bounds for protocols sealing quantum data exist.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ta, 03.67.Ac, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that many users share a single quantum com-
munication channel in multiuser transmission. Each user
decodes the transmitted information from the channel
and passes the carrier to the subsequent user. In this
case, they need a quantum repeating device [1] in which
the information can be decoded reliably, while the quan-
tum state of the carrier is expected to be optimally pre-
served. (Note that such a device was called as “quantum
repeater” in Ref. [1], but the meaning differs from these
in Refs. [2, 3]. To avoid confusion, we prefer not to use
the term quantum repeater in this paper.) When quan-
tum information is being transmitted, the information-
disturbance tradeoff of the devices was intensively stud-
ied in literature [4, 5, 6, 7]. Optimal quantum repeating
devices were also proposed in Refs. [1, 8, 9, 10]. Never-
theless, in most cases of quantum communication, a user
generally cares little about the exact quantum state of
the carrier. Instead, he only wants to know the classical
information encoded in this quantum state. For exam-
ple, in the well-known quantum key distribution (QKD)
problem [11, 12, 13], a classical bit 0 (1) can be encoded
as the quantum state |0〉 or |+〉 (|1〉 or |−〉), where |0〉
and |1〉 are the two orthogonal states of a qubit and
|±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. An eavesdropper is only inter-
ested in whether the classical content is 0 or 1. There is
no need for him to distinguish |0〉 from |+〉 or |1〉 from
|−〉. Therefore, it is more important to study the trade-
off between classical information gained versus quantum
disturbance in quantum cryptography and search for op-
timal quantum repeating devices for this purpose.
On the other hand, quantum seal (QS) is a relatively
less-known quantum cryptographic problem. Its goal can
be summarized as follows. The owner of the secret data
to be sealed (denoted as Alice) encodes the data with
quantum states. Any reader (denoted as Bob) can de-
code the data from these states without the help of Alice.
Meanwhile, if data has been decoded, it should cause a
disturbance on the states, which is detectable by Alice. A
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QS protocol is considered to be secure if Bob cannot read
the data while escaping Alice’s detection simultaneously.
QS can be classified by the types and the readability of
the sealed data. If the data are a single classical bit, it
is called quantum bit seals (QBSs). Else, if data are a
classical string, it is called quantum string seals (QSSs).
If data can always be retrieved by the reader with cer-
tainty, it is called a perfect QS. Else, if data can only be
retrieved with a non-vanished error rate, it is an imper-
fect QS. The first perfect QBS protocol was proposed by
Bechmann-Pasquinucci [14], but then it was found that
all perfect QBS protocols are insecure against collective
measurements [15]. Shortly later, it was proven that im-
perfect QBS also has security bounds [16]. Nevertheless,
it was proven that secure imperfect QSS protocols exist
[17, 18, 19, 20]. (Note that it was claimed in Ref. [21]
that all QSS protocols are insecure. But as indicated
later in Ref. [18], the cheating strategy proposed in Ref.
[21] is not a successful cheating because it cannot obtain
nontrivial amount of information while escaping the de-
tection simultaneously [18, 19]. It was also realized in
Ref. [20] that when the cheating in Ref. [21] escapes the
detection, the ratio between the amount of information
obtained by the cheater and that of the sealed string is
arbitrarily small as the length of the string increases.)
More intriguingly, it was proposed in Ref. [17] that se-
cure QSS can be utilized to realize a kind of QBS, which
is secure in practice. Very recently, it was found [22]
that QS has a very close relationship with quantum bit
commitment [23], which is another primitive of quantum
cryptography.
Though the theories of quantum repeating devices and
quantum seals are developed independently in literature,
we can see that they are closely related since they both fo-
cus on the information-disturbance tradeoff on quantum
systems. In the next section, we will show the rigorous
equivalence between their parameters. As the examples
of the application of this equivalence, we will apply the
existing theory of QS to study quantum repeating devices
and obtain interesting results on their fidelity bounds and
optimality in Sec. III. Also, we will apply the existing
theory of quantum repeating devices in Sec. IV, to study
the security bounds for QS protocols sealing quantum
data.
2II. EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN QUANTUM
REPEATING DEVICES AND QUANTUM SEALS
A. Theory of quantum repeating devices
Let us review briefly the description of quantum re-
peating devices in Refs. [1, 8]. Suppose that an input
state |ψ〉 reaches a user via a quantum communication
channel. This user not only wants to decode the informa-
tion of the state for himself alone, but also wants to leave
the state less disturbed so that the subsequent user(s)
can also decode some information of the state without
his help. For this purpose, he runs a device which ac-
complishes the following tasks:
(i) A certain positive operator-valued measurement
(POVM) {Πk} is performed on |ψ〉.
(ii) When the outcome k is observed at the output of
the device, he uses an inference rule k → |φk〉 to obtain
the estimated signal state |φk〉 as an approximation of
the input state |ψ〉. Note that the exact form of |φk〉
should be known to the user. That is, e.g., when |φk〉 is
a qubit x |0〉+ y |1〉, he should know the values of x and
y.
(iii) After the POVM, a conditional state |ψk〉 (whose
form depends on the value of k) is left to the subsequent
user(s) for further decoding.
Such a device is the quantum repeating device that we
are referring to. From this description, we can see that it
is closely related with the well-known quantum cloning
machine [24], whose purpose is also to transform an input
state |ψ〉 into two (or more) output states |φk〉 and |ψk〉.
The difference is that at the end of the quantum cloning,
the exact form of |φk〉 can still be left unknown to the
user. He may only own a quantum system whose state is
|φk〉. That is, a quantum repeating device can be viewed
as a quantum cloning machine plus a measurement on
the output state |φk〉.
A user can choose the POVM at his will to construct
his specific quantum repeating device. Different choices
will result in different output states |φk〉 and |ψk〉, which
determine the quality of the device. Therefore it is natu-
ral to seek for the choice which can optimize this quality.
There are two important parameters characterizing the
quality of quantum repeating devices, i.e., the transmis-
sion F and estimation fidelities G. Generally, we are
interested in the case where the possibility distribution
of the input state looks completely random to the user.
In this case, the corresponding fidelities for the given in-
put signal |ψ〉, averaging over all possible outcomes, are
defined as [1, 8]
Fψ =
∑
k
pk |〈ψ |ψk〉|2 , (1)
and
Gψ =
∑
k
pk |〈ψ |φk〉|2 . (2)
Here, pk denotes the probability for the outcome k to be
observed at the output of the quantum repeating device,
so that the input state |ψ〉 is decoded as the estimated
signal state |φk〉, while the state |ψk〉 is left to the sub-
sequent user. Performing average over all possible input
states |ψ〉, i.e., over the alphabet A of transmittable sym-
bols (states), the transmission fidelity F and the estima-
tion fidelity G are given, respectively, by
F =
∫
A
dψFψ (3)
and
G =
∫
A
dψGψ. (4)
Some bounds on the values of F and G of different
quantum repeating devices were already found. Con-
sider two extreme cases. In the case where nothing is
done by the quantum repeating device, the input state is
passed to the subsequent user unaltered and thus F = 1.
Meanwhile, the outcome has to be estimated by guess,
thus G = 1/d, where d is the dimension of the Hilbert
space of the input states. In the opposite case where the
quantum repeating device gains the optimal information
from the input state so that the final state left to the
subsequent user cannot provide any information on the
initial state, it was shown that F = G = 2/(d+ 1) [5, 6].
Therefore we have
2/(d+ 1) ≤ F ≤ 1 (5)
and
1/d ≤ G ≤ 2/(d+ 1). (6)
In general cases where the quantum repeating device
provides only partial information while partially preserv-
ing the quantum state of the input signal for the subse-
quent user, a tighter bound between F and G was found
[7] for randomly distributed input signals, i.e.,
(F − F0)2 + d2(G−G0) +
2(d− 2)(F − F0)(G−G0)
≤ (d− 1)/(d+ 1)2, (7)
where F0 = (d+2)/[2(d+1)] and G0 = 3/[2(d+1)]. For
two-dimensional Hilbert space, the bound reduces to
(F − 2/3)2 + 4(G− 1/2)2 ≤ 1/9. (8)
B. Theory of quantum seals
The model of QBS (i.e., the protocols sealing a single
classical bit) was established in Ref. [16]. By analogy,
here we establish a general model of QS (i.e., covering
the protocols sealing any kind of classical bit(s), strings,
or quantum information) as follows:
3(1) Alice, who owns the information b to be sealed,
maps b into a certain quantum state |φ⊗ ψ〉 of the system
Φ⊗Ψ and keeps the system Φ to her own while making
Ψ accessible by any potential reader Bob who may want
to decode b.
(2) Alice lets Bob know an operation P for decoding.
If the state of Ψ is an eigenstate of P , the protocol is a
perfect QS. Otherwise it is an imperfect QS.
(3) Alice lets Bob know a series of sets Gi’s and a series
of values bi’s, which satisfies Gi ∩ Gj = ∅ (∀i 6= j), such
that if he applies P on Ψ and the outcome g belongs to
set Gi, he should take the value of the sealed data as
b′ = bi; while if g does not belong to any Gi, the sealed
information cannot be identified, i.e., Bob needs to guess
b′ by himself. (In the case where the sealed information
b is a quantum data, each bi should be understood as a
set of parameters sufficient to describe a quantum state.)
Note that since the state of Ψ may not be an eigenstate
of P , the value of b′ thus obtained will match Alice’s
input b with a certain probability only. Let α denote
the average of this probability over all possible b and b′,
which measures the readability of the protocol.
(4) At any time, Alice can access to the entire sys-
tem Φ ⊗ Ψ and compare its current final state |φ′ ⊗ ψ′〉
with the initial state |φ⊗ ψ〉. Therefore, if b has
been read, Alice can detect it with the probability
1 − |〈φ⊗ ψ| φ′ ⊗ ψ′〉|2. Let β denote the average of this
probability over all possible initial and final states, which
measures the security of the protocol.
For QBS, b is limited to a single classical bit. In this
case, it was shown [16] that the parameters α and β
in such a protocol must satisfy the following security
bounds:
β ≤ 1/2 (9)
and
α+ β ≤ 9/8. (10)
C. Equivalence
By comparing the above descriptions, we can see the
relationship between the two subjects. Suppose that Al-
ice encodes a certain information with a quantum state
|ψ〉, Bob decodes the information from |ψ〉 with a quan-
tum repeating device suggested by Alice, and the re-
sultant state |ψk〉 is acquired later by Alice to detect
whether the information has been decoded. Then the
quantum repeating device in fact fulfills an embodied im-
plementation of quantum seals. On the contrary, Alice
can use a quantum seal protocol to encode some informa-
tion on a quantum system Ψ and send it to Bob via the
quantum communication channel, Bob decodes it with
the operation P suggested by the protocol, and another
subsequent user instead of Alice receives the final state
of the system Ψ for further decoding. Then the quan-
tum seal works as a quantum repeating device in this
QUANTUM REPEATING DEVICES QUANTUM SEALS
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FIG. 1: The equivalence between the elements of quantum
repeating devices and quantum seals.
case. Therefore, quantum repeating devices and quan-
tum seals are in fact equivalent. That is, we can set up
a mapping between the elements of the two subjects as
shown in Fig. 1. Then a scheme for quantum repeating
device can be constructed from a quantum seal protocol
and vice versa.
Consequently, there is a rigorous quantitative relation-
ship between the parameters F , G and α, β describing
the quality of quantum repeating devices and quantum
seals, respectively. Since the input and output states |ψ〉
and |ψk〉 and the user’s estimated signal state |φk〉 of
quantum repeating devices are equivalent to the initial
and final states of the system Ψ and Bob’s decoded re-
sult bi of quantum seals, respectively, by the definitions
of the parameters F , G and α, β, we yield
F = 1− β (11)
and
G = α. (12)
Nevertheless, we should note that the existing theories
of quantum repeating devices and quantum seals focus
on different species of information-disturbance tradeoff.
On one hand, the existing theory of quantum repeating
devices generally studies merely the case where the user
wants to decode the quantum aspect of the information
encoded in the quantum states. The case where the user
tries to decode only the classical information encoded
in the quantum states was left out in literature. But
as mentioned in Sec. I, in many practical communica-
tion settings including QKD, an essential problem is that
an eavesdropper wants to know the classical information
only. That is, he needs not to distinguish the quantum
states exactly, as long as these states are corresponding
to the same classical information. Therefore the existing
theory of quantum repeating devices contributed less to
the security analysis of quantum communication. On the
other hand, the security of protocols sealing classical in-
formation (either strings or a single bit) was well studied
in literature, while it still remains unclear how (in)secure
the protocols sealing quantum information can be. For
4this reason, our current finding on the equivalence be-
tween quantum repeating devices and quantum seals is
instructive. It indicates that we can apply the existing
theories interchangeably and find interesting results for
both fields. In the following, we will present some exam-
ples.
III. FIDELITY BOUNDS AND OPTIMALITY
OF QUANTUM REPEATING DEVICES FOR
CLASSICAL INFORMATION
In this section, we will use the security bounds of quan-
tum seals to find interesting results on quantum repeating
devices. Consider the quantum repeating device decod-
ing one single bit of classical mutual information from
quantum states. In this case, the bound (10) applies.
Using Eqs. (11) and (12), it can be rewritten as
G− F ≤ 1/8. (13)
Note that in this case, G is the estimation fidelity of
the decoded classical (instead of quantum) information.
Therefore the bound (6) obtained in the quantum case is
not necessarily applied. Consequently, the bounds (7,8)
no longer exist. Indeed, when G − 1/2 > 1/6, i.e., G ≥
2/3, we have
(F − 2/3)2 + 4(G− 1/2)2 ≥ 4(G− 1/2)2 > 1/9. (14)
This inequality holds for any dimension d because Eq.
(10) and its derivative Eq. (13) are valid regardless the
dimension of the Hilbert space of the input states. In
the d = 2 case, i.e., the input state is a qubit, Eq. (14)
clearly shows that the quantum bound (8) is surpassed
for any quantum repeating device which can decoded one
classical bit of mutual information from the input quan-
tum states with the estimation fidelity G ≥ 2/3. Such
a value of G can indeed be reached in real settings. For
example, in the original BB84 QKD protocol [11], the
quantum states |0〉 and |+〉 both encode the classical bit
0, while the states |1〉 and |−〉 both encode 1. Then
a quantum repeating device can be designed as follows.
Measure the input states in the Breidbart basis [25], i.e.,
{cos(pi/8) |0〉+sin(pi/8) |1〉 , cos(5pi/8) |0〉+sin(5pi/8) |1〉},
and output “0” (“1”) if the measurement result is
cos(pi/8) |0〉+sin(pi/8) |1〉 (cos(5pi/8) |0〉+sin(5pi/8) |1〉).
In this case, randomly distributed input bits can be de-
coded with the estimation fidelity G = cos2(pi/8) ≃
0.8536 > 2/3.
One of the significance of this result is that it indi-
cates that the security of quantum communication chan-
nel needs to be evaluated more conservatively. This is
because the transmission fidelity F , being the measure on
how well the input quantum state is preserved, is related
directly to the probability of detecting the eavesdropper
who uses the quantum repeating device to decode in-
formation on the state. Higher F means less successful
probability of the detection. Therefore Eq. (14) surpass-
ing Eq. (8) means that F can be higher for the same
G if the eavesdropper decodes only the classical infor-
mation instead of trying to know the exact form of the
input quantum state. Such a case is exactly what the
eavesdropper does in most quantum communication we
are interested today (e.g., QKD). Therefore Eq. (13) will
be more appropriate than Eqs. (7,8) for evaluating the
security of such quantum communication channels.
Another question immediately followed is whether op-
timal quantum repeating devices for decoding quantum
information [i.e., whose F and G saturate the bounds
(7,8), for example, the schemes proposed in Ref. [1]] are
still optimal for decoding classical information. Before
giving an answer, we must notice what “optimal” means
in the latter case. As shown above, when the purpose
of the quantum repeating device is to decode a classical
bit only, the quantum bound (6) is gone. It was proven
in Ref. [15] that perfect quantum seals can reach α = 1
and β = 0 simultaneously. Therefore, using such quan-
tum seals as the schemes of quantum repeating devices
can reach F = G = 1. That is, if by “optimal” we want
to favor all users so that each of them can decode the
bit with an estimation fidelity as high as possible, while
leaving the carrier as less disturbed as possible, there ex-
ist perfect quantum repeating devices. But in this case,
the quantum communication channel is trivial. This is
because such perfect quantum repeating devices, being a
direct analog of perfect quantum seals, will then have to
encode different values of classical bits with orthogonal
quantum states [15]. Since no nonorthogonal states are
necessary, the channel can be completely classical. For
example, simply writing a bit on a piece of paper and
passing it through all the users can reach F = G = 1. In
this sense, the quantum repeating devices saturating the
bounds (7,8) are surely not optimal for decoding classical
information.
Here we consider another meaning of optimal. That is,
our purpose is changed into trying to saturate the bound
(13) to find a balance between a high-estimation fidelity
G and a low-transmission fidelity F . Since a lower F
means a higher β, our purpose means to find the bal-
ance of detecting eavesdroppers with a high probability,
while still keeping the encoded bit highly readable. [Note
that we do not want the quantum repeating devices that
can saturate the bound (9) because it is indicates in Ref.
[16] that the input states must contain zero amount of
information of the encoded bits to saturate this bound.]
Optimal quantum repeating devices for decoding quan-
tum information are also not necessarily optimal for this
purpose. This is because, as shown above, the bound (13)
can violate the bounds (7,8) for certain values of G. On
the other hand, In Ref. [16], an optimal scheme of quan-
tum seals that saturates the bound (10) was proposed.
Namely, Alice should seal the bit b in the form
|φb ⊗ ψb〉 =
√
3
2
∑
i
c
(b)
b,i
∣∣∣fˆ (b)i
〉 ∣∣∣eˆ(b)i
〉
+
1
2
∑
i
c
(b¯)
b,i
∣∣∣fˆ (b¯)i
〉 ∣∣∣eˆ(b¯)i
〉
. (15)
5Here
∣∣∣fˆ (b)i
〉
’s (
∣∣∣eˆ(b)i
〉
’s) are the orthogonal states of Al-
ice’s system Φ (Bob’s system Ψ) corresponding to the
sealed bit b, with c
(b)
b,i ’s being the superposition coeffi-
cients. This scheme has α = 3/4, β = 3/8 thus reaches
α+ β = 9/8. Therefore, optimal quantum repeating de-
vices for decoding classical information can be designed
accordingly.
As a simplified example, suppose that in a quantum
communication channel, the classical bit 0 is encoded as
either (
√
3/2) |0〉+(1/2) |1〉 or (√3/2) |0〉− (1/2) |1〉 and
1 is encoded as either (1/2) |0〉+(√3/2) |1〉 or (1/2) |0〉−
(
√
3/2) |1〉. Then the optimal quantum repeating device
is to measure the input states in the basis {|0〉 , |1〉}, and
output “0” (“1”) if the measurement result is |0〉 (|1〉).
It can saturate the bound (13) for randomly distributed
inputs.
Interestingly, the encoding method of the original
BB84 QKD protocol cannot allow quantum repeating de-
vices saturating the bound (13). As calculated above, the
best estimation fidelity is G = cos2(pi/8). According to
Eq. (9) of Ref. [16], it can be calculated that the trans-
mission fidelity is F = 1− 2G(1−G) = 3/4, therefore we
have G − F ≃ 0.1036 < 1/8 in this case. It will be in-
teresting to study what advantages can be brought when
the optimal encoding method suggested by Eq. (15) is
adopted in QKD or other quantum cryptographic task.
IV. SECURITY BOUNDS FOR SEALING
QUANTUM DATA
Ever since the first proposal of the concept of quantum
seals, it became a major problem whether uncondition-
ally secure quantum seals exist. As reviewed in Sec. I,
the security of the protocols sealing classical data was
already studied thoroughly [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. For
the case where the sealed information is quantum data,
a protocol was proposed in Ref. [26], but later found
insecure by the author himself. However, to date, there
is still a lack of a general conclusion on the exact secu-
rity bound of the protocols sealing quantum data. Here,
with the equivalence between quantum seals and quan-
tum repeating devices, we can study the problem with
the theory of the latter.
Before we proceed, it is important to note that it makes
a major difference whether the quantum data to be sealed
is known to Alice or not. If the quantum data are known
to Alice, then the problem is in fact equivalent to the
sealing of classical information. Alice can simply use a
classical string to describe how to prepare a quantum sys-
tem whose state contains the quantum data to be sealed
and seal this classical string with QSS protocols such as
the one proposed in Ref. [17]. With this method, even
sealing a single qubit can be secure. This is because for
a qubit |ψ〉 = cos θ |0〉+ sin θ |1〉, the value of θ can have
infinite possibilities. It differs from the sealing of a single
classical bit, where the sealed bit b can only have two
possible values 0 and 1. Therefore the insecurity proof of
QBS [16] does not apply to this case. On the contrary,
from the security proof of QSS [17] it can be seen that
if Bob wants to decode θ with the reliability α → 1, the
probability for him to be detected will be β → 1 thus the
protocol is secure.
Now let us focus on the case where the quantum data
to be sealed are unknown to Alice. To be rigorous, we
further assume that Alice has only one single copy of
the quantum system containing these data, so that her
knowledge on the data is minimized. Let us apply the
theory of quantum repeating devices in this case. By
combining Eqs. (5) and (11), we can see that any QS pro-
tocol using a d-dimensional state to seal quantum data
is bound by
β ≤ 1− 2/(d+ 1). (16)
It means that when the sealed data are a quantum state
in a high-dimensional Hilbert space (d → ∞), the ex-
isting theory provides little limitation on the detecting
probability β. Thus, a properly designed protocol may
reach β → 1 when sealing a high-dimensional quantum
state and therefore can be regarded as secure. On the
other hand, the security level of QS for low-dimensional
quantum states is bound significantly by the dimension-
ality d. Especially, when d = 2, we have
β ≤ 1/3. (17)
Note that even when the sealed data are a qubit, the
quantum state used to seal it is not necessarily a two-
dimensional state. If the sealed qubit is mapped into
a high-dimensional state and, most important of all, if
there is a method to force Bob to decode other abundant
information when he wants to decode the sealed qubit,
then QS protocols sealing a qubit can be made secure.
Nevertheless, so far we cannot prove the existence of this
method. Therefore, before such a method can be found
in future researches, the security of QS sealing a single
qubit has to be bound by Eq. (17). That is, when Bob
decoded the sealed qubit, Alice stands only 1/3 chances
to detect it. Comparing to the security bound of QS
sealing a single classical bit [16] (i.e., β ≤ 1/2), sealing a
qubit is even less secure.
At last, we would like to note that Eqs. (7) and (8)
cannot immediately give an analog of Eq. (10) for QS
protocols sealing quantum data. This is because there is
still a subtle difference between QS and quantum repeat-
ing devices. According to feature (2) of the above model
of QS, Alice should provide Bob with an operation P for
decoding. This operation can generally enhance the re-
liability α of data decoded by Bob (unless Alice wants
to mislead Bob to the wrong outcome in the QS pro-
tocol). On the other hand, in the quantum repeating
device problem, Eq. (6) was obtained without assuming
the existence of such a suggested operation. Therefore
in QS protocols sealing quantum data, G (i.e., α) is not
restricted by Eq. (6) and therefore the bounds in Eqs.
6(7) and (8) may be surpassed. Exact bounds of G will
depend on the details of the operation P and vary for
different protocols.
V. SUMMARY
Thus it is shown that the transmission fidelity F and
the estimation fidelity G describing the quality of quan-
tum repeating devices are related directly to the read-
ability α and the detecting probability β of quantum
seals. Therefore, the theory in one field can be applied
to the other. With this method, we found that the ex-
isting fidelity bounds Eqs. (7,8) of quantum repeating
devices for decoding quantum information can be sur-
passed when they are used for decoding classical infor-
mation from quantum states. Instead, the bound in the
latter case is Eq. (13). Also, optimal quantum repeating
devices for quantum information are not necessarily op-
timal for classical information. We also found that the
security of protocols sealing quantum data is bounded by
Eqs. (16,17).
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